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"It is not that the *money* which the Public Creditor receives, as interest for his capital, is *less* than it used to be; it is that the *quantity of goods* he receives for his money is *less*; and he will be still receiving less and less, while your taxes will be rising more and more. If the next Administration" (Addington was just at this time coming into power in place of Pitt) "mean to go on like the last, it would be a good thing for the country if no man would lend them a groat. Let them take three-fourths of a man's interest, or property, from him, and take off the taxes, and the people would be doubly gainers. If you *reduce the National Debt*, we may laugh and sing at home and bid defiance to all the world; if you *do not reduce it*, the consequence will be, that, instead of paying the National Creditor 120 *quartern loaves* for a year's interest of his £.100 you will go on, till you only pay him 2 or 3 *quartern loaves*. Depend upon it that will be the fate of the National Creditor."—Mr. Horne Tooke's Speech, in the House of Commons, 2nd March, 1801.

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TO THE READER.

With my next Number I shall publish an additional Sheet, containing the TABLES OF CONTENTS, INDEX, &c. to the last Volume.

PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION
OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS
TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS
IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XXVI.

Mr. Horne Tooke and the Reformers—Effect of Lord King's Example—Two Prices—How these would affect the Government, the Generals, the Judges, the Sinécure Placemen and Pensioners—Lord Mornington's Speech in 1794—Progress of the Assignats in France—Mr. Perceval's Speech in the House of Commons, 9th July, 1811.

GENTLEMEN,

Look at the motto! Look at the motto; and, especially, if any of you should unfortunately be *fund-holders*; in that case, let me beseech you to look at the motto. They are the words of a very wise man. They were spoken, you see, rather more than ten years ago. The speaker was *laughed at* by some, and *railed at* by others; but, I imagine, that, at this time, those, who then laughed, are more disposed to cry, though I by no means suppose, that

the *railers* have ceased, or ever will cease their railing, as long as they have tongues or pens wherewith to rail. The House of Commons, the Honourable House, ejected Mr. TOOKE from amongst them, soon after he made this speech. They did so upon the ground of his being a *clergyman in Holy Orders*! No matter: they got rid of him; but, they have *not got rid of the event that he foretold*. Oh, no! that is coming upon them in spite of all their triumphs over Mr. TOOKE and Mr. PAINE and Messrs. MUIR, PALMER, MARGAROT, GERALD, WINTERBOTTOM, GILBERT WAKEFIELD, and many others. The government beat all these reformers; they not only put them down; they not only ruined the greater part of them; but they succeeded in making the nation believe that such ruin was just. Well. The government and the nation will now, of course, not pretend, that the *present events* have sprung from the Jacobins and Reformers. Mr. TOOKE told them to reduce the National Debt. They rejected his advice. They despised his warning. They turned him out of parliament. Well. Let them, then, not blame him for what has since happened, and what is now coming to pass.

I beg you, Gentlemen, to reflect well on these observations; for, such reflection will be very useful in preventing you from being deceived in future, and will enable you, when the utmost of the evil comes, to ascertain who are the men who have been THE AUTHORS OF THE EVIL, and to whom, accordingly, you ought to look for a just RESPONSIBILITY. But, upon this *vital* part of the subject I have some hints to offer to you hereafter: at present I must return, for a while, to the point where I broke off in

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my last Letter, namely, the reason for the alarm of the Government at the prospect of seeing Lord King's example followed.

I spoke of the TWO PRICES before; but, let me say a few more words upon that very interesting part of our subject. *Two Prices* have always proved the death of paper-money. In this case it would have been the same, and, in the end, it will still be the same; for, the Bill of Lord Stanhope can do no more than retard the event for six or nine months; and mind, I tell you this with as much confidence as I would venture to foretel the arrival of Christmas day. I do not say, that the event will come in six or nine months; but, I say, that *this Bill* will not keep it off for a greater length of time than that. If TWO PRICES were generally made, we should see the gold and silver back into circulation immediately; but, *none of it could get to the Bank*, because no man would pay his TAXES in gold and silver. Consequently the *fund-holder* and the *government* would be paid in paper, while gold and silver would be circulating amongst all the rest of the community. As soon as there are two prices, the paper must depreciate at an enormous rate; and, as the government would have to pay its contractors and others whose pay was not fixed, in this depreciated paper, it must have a *greater quantity of that paper*, and it must come from the Bank. It is so easy to see how this must work; how rapidly it must go on; how soon it must render the paper worth little more than its weight in rags; all this is so easy to see, that I will not suppose any one of you so very dull as not to perceive it.

The government, with nothing but paper at its command, would soon begin to feel somewhat like a person who has taken a powerful emetic. The big round drops of sweat would stand upon its forehead; its knees would knock together; it would look pale as a ghost; an universal feebleness would seize it. That is to say, all this would take place, if the government persevered in the Pitt system, and that it would do so, who can doubt after what we have seen during the last twenty years. If the TWO PRICES were openly made, and became general, as they, in all probability, would, in the course of six or eight months, the paper would fall so low as that 5, or, perhaps, 10 shillings would be required to

purchase a *quartern loaf*. How, then, would the government, who would get nothing but paper, make shift to pay its way? The Generals and Judges and others, having a *fixed* pay, would, indeed, still be paid as they were before, and, of course, the government would lose nothing by taking paper as far as this description of expence went; for, you will observe, that I hold it to be impossible, that the parties I have just mentioned, namely, the Generals, the Judges, the Tax-Commissioners, and the like; I hold it to be impossible, that these men should not all of them be excessively happy to take the paper-money, though at a hundred for one, seeing that the greater the degree of depreciation, the finer the opportunity for them to give proofs of their devotion to public credit. But, though my Lords the Judges and Lord Arden and Lord Buckinghamshire and Lord Liverpool and Lord Bathurst and the Marquis of Buckingham and Lord Camden and Old George Rose and Mr. Canning and my neighbour the Apothecary General and Lord Kenyon and Lady Louisa Paget, and, indeed, the hundreds of those who have *fixed-sums* paid them by the government out of money raised upon the people, whether in the shape of salary, sinecure, or pension; though all these persons would, I dare say, from motives of public spirit, cheerfully continue to take the paper till a pound of it would not purchase a pinch of snuff; still, there would be some things and some *services* that must be paid for in money, or they would not be obtained. Beef and Pork and Biscuit could not be bought without real money. These are commodities that do not move without an equivalent. Whether the *soldiers* would be paid, under such circumstances, in paper so much reduced in value, I shall not pretend to say, and will leave the point to be settled by those who have lately said so much about this useful and numerous class of active citizens. But, one thing is certain: that THEY must be paid in a kind of money that will purchase eatables. They have bargained to receive a certain sum *per day*; and, if the same should not purchase half so much beer or beef as it does now, the bargain will not be so good an one as it is now; though, observe, I am not supposing, that there would not be found public spirit enough amongst the soldiers to make them take the paper in preference to the gold. At any rate, this is a matter which belongs

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exclusively to those who have the management of our affairs, and who are paid very well for such management.

It would be useless to extend our remarks here. It is as clear as day-light, that, whenever TWO PRICES shall be generally established, the death of the paper is at hand, and, indeed, *the death of the funding system*; because, owing to the rapidity of the depreciation, the fund-holders, our poor friend GRIZZLE GREENHORN and all the rest of them, would soon be in the situation described by Mr. HORNE TOOKE, in the passage taken for my motto; that is to say, a hundred pounds of their stock would yield them a couple or three quartern loaves in the year; and, it is within the compass of *possibility*, that many persons, who now are enabled to ride in their coaches by incomes derived from the funds, may end their days as paupers or beggars. In short, it is quite impossible for any man of common sense not to perceive, that the establishment of TWO PRICES would put an end, in a short time, not only to the property of the fund-holders, but to the *sinecures* and *pensions*, and also to *great numbers of other emoluments derived from the public revenue*. Put an end to all for a time at least, and subjecting them to an *after revision*.

If we are of opinion, that *this effect* would have been produced by the example of Lord King being followed, there is, I think, little room for wonder, that the ministers were *alarmed* at the prospect. I know it will be said, and with perfect truth, that the same effect will be produced by Lord Stanhope's Bill; but, supposing it to be produced full *as soon* by the Bill, it does not follow, that the ministers *perceive* that. On the contrary, it would seem, that they do not perceive it at all; and, it is evident, that they have a sort of vague notion, that the Bill will *stay* the depreciation. I am convinced that it will not; I am convinced, that it will hasten the depreciation, and though not quite so fast as the example of Lord King would, still that, in the end, the effect will be the same. But, the ministers could, in the one case, see the effect: in the other they appear not to have seen it; and, this is quite sufficient to account for their giving their support to the Bill.

I said before, Gentlemen, that this Bill

was the *first of a series* of measures, the object of which would be to keep up the paper by *the force of law*. This seems to be the opinion of all those who have opposed it in the House of Peers: that it is merely a step in the old beaten path of keeping up by the arm of power a depreciated paper-currency. This course has been before pursued, in other countries, and it has, in every part of the world, led to the same end: the total destruction of the paper. Each of the Colonies, now moulded into an united nation in America, had its *debt*, its *paper-money*, its *legal tenders*, and its *public bankruptcy*, before their separation from England, and even before the revolutionary quarrel began. But, it was in *France*, where the thing was performed upon a grand scale; and, by taking a view somewhat more close than we have hitherto done, of the progress of the measures in France, we shall be able more correctly to judge of the tendency of what is now going on here.

There are divers histories of what was done in France, relative to the *assignats*; but, I choose to take for my authority one of the present Ministers, the MARQUIS WELLESLEY, who, when he was LORD MORNINGTON, made a speech in the House of Commons, which was afterwards published in a pamphlet, or rather *book*, in which he gave an account of all the pranks played with the assignats in France, up to the time of his making the speech, which was on the 21st of January, 1794, just three years and a month before the then ministry, whom he supported, issued an Order in Council to protect the Bank of England against the demands of cash for their notes.

In this memorable speech, manifestly drawn up for the purpose of exciting horror in the people of England at the wickedness of the French Rulers relative to the assignats, and also to make the people believe, that the state of the assignats must prove the overthrow of France; in this memorable speech, not only facts are stated, but principles and maxims of finance are laid down. We will take a cursory view of them all; for *time*, which tries every thing, has now brought us into a state to judge correctly of those facts, principles, and maxims.

Lord Wellesley told the House of Commons, that the rulers of France were very

wicked, but that they were not less foolish than wicked; that their ignorance was, at least, equal to their villainy, though the latter was surprizingly great. He said, that, "the French Revolutionary Government, in order to supply an extravagant expenditure, had recourse, at first, "to increasing the mass of paper-money; "and, that they declared, that they had "no other means of sustaining the pressure of "the war, than by the creation of an additional quantity of assignats." There is, then, nothing original in the declarations of Lord Liverpool and Perceval and Rose. Nothing new in their recent assertions, that it was the paper-money that enabled them to provide for the defence of the kingdom, to make such great exertions against the "enemy of the human race," to gain such victories in Spain and Portugal, and to add such glories to the English name! This was all very fine and full of comfort; but, as you now see, Gentlemen, there was nothing new in it. The same thing had been said before by the revolutionary rulers of France; the same thing had been said by Danton and Robespierre and their associates in praise of the revolutionary money of France.

The Ministers have frequently denied, that the coin of the country is, or ought to be, the standard of value. Rose and Lord Westmoreland and several others of them have denied, that the Bank notes ought to be looked upon as depreciated, merely because they would not go for the same quantity of gold as formerly; and the hireling writers have taken infinite pains to decry and run down the gold and silver coin. One of them calls guineas an encumbrance; another says that gold and silver are merely articles of traffick, and that the Bank notes are the only money fitting the country; another has said, that, were it not for the National Debt, the patronage, and the paper-money, the government could have no existence, and that the Bank notes offer to the government a most indestructible support, because they make the daily bread of every individual depend upon the government; and, another has said, that Bank paper is the best bond of individual and public security, and the only medium of currency to suit and exert the energies of an insular and commercial people!

What a similarity between this language and the language of the Rulers of France in favour of their assignats! They called

them, as Lord Wellesley said in his speech, revolutionary money; their Chancellor of the Exchequer said that it was a happy thing for the people to have Republican assignats instead of pieces of metal bearing the effigy of tyrants; that the whole nation despised the corrupting metals, and that he would soon find a way of driving back the vile dung into the bowels of the earth. In another part of his speech Lord Wellesley tells us, that people were imprisoned and punished for their contempt of assignats.

Nevertheless, the people of France had, it seems, still an unnatural hankering after gold and silver in preference to assignats; and, they did in fact, make TWO PRICES; the consequence of which was an enormous rise in the price of all the necessaries of life, the proprietors of which were reviled as enemies of the country, and, as such, many hundreds of them were put to death. This, however, was not sufficient to put a stop to the rise of prices, and, indeed, did not check it at all. Then came the law of MAXIMUM (as it will in England if the present course be pursued), fixing the highest price at which any of the necessaries of life should be sold, and at which men should work and render their services. This terrible law, lord Wellesley tells us, had nearly starved the whole nation; for the farmers would not bring their produce to market, and tradesmen kept their goods locked up. Then, he tells us, that these persons were pursued as monopolists; and thus, said lord Wellesley, "every farmer whose barns and granaries are not empty; every merchant "and tradesman whose warehouse or shop "is not entirely unprovided with goods, "must be subject to the charge of monopoly. This crime is punished differently, "according to the enormity of the case; "but, most frequently the punishment is "death." So that it is time for farmers and tradesmen to look about them, and especially the farmers; who, if they do not already see the danger of their landlord's property being withheld from him, will, perhaps, be more clear-sighted when their own natural fate is pointed out. They hear LORD KING accused of black malignity; they hear him charged with selfishness; they hear him classed along with pedlars and Jews. This was, as lord Wellesley tells us, precisely the language which Danton and Robespierre and their underlings made use of towards the people of property in France, who had a



"contempt for assignats." They were accused of *incivism*; they were called *egotists*, and were, in almost the very words in which LORD KING is now arraigned by the COURIER, told that they "committed a robbery against the RIGHTS OF SOCIETY"! And, this is what the people of England are told, observe, after eighteen years of war, after eighteen years of blood and taxation, in order, as they were promised, to preserve their country from what they saw going on in France!

"But, our paper is *at par*," say some of the PITTITES still; "Our paper is not *depreciated*." So they said in France. Yes, said lord WELLESLEY, "the French minister of Finance has boasted, that his assignats are *at par*; but, the laws which have been passed for punishing with *long imprisonment* any person who takes, gives, or offers assignats *under par*, sufficiently account for this circumstance." Good God! It would really seem, that every saying is to come home to us; that upon our devoted heads are to be visited all that was felt, and, which is more, perhaps, all that was, by our rulers, said to be felt by the people of France; aye, it really would seem, that all, that *all*, to the very letter, is now to come home to the people of England, who were led to build their hopes of success and of safety upon the ruin of the people, or at least, the government, of France! This very bill now under discussion, will impose a *penalty*, whether of *imprisonment* or not I do not yet know, upon any person, who takes, or gives, or offers, bank notes, *under par*. The prohibition was made in the Lords, and the Minister has said, that he means to add the *penalty*!

Let us now look, then, at the *contrast*, which Lord WELLESLEY drew, upon that memorable occasion, between the situation of England and that of France. "From this disgusting scene," said he, "let us turn our eyes to *our own situation*. Here the contrast is striking in all its parts. Here we see nothing of the character and genius of ARBITRARY FINANCE; none of the bold frauds of bankrupt power; none of the wild struggles and plunges of despotism in distress; no lopping off from the capital of the debt; no suspension of interest: no robbery under the name of loan, NO RAISING THE VALUE, no DEBASING THE SUBSTANCE of THE COIN. Here we be-

"hold public credit, of every description, rising under all the disadvantages of a general war; an ample revenue, flowing freely and copiously from the opulence of a contented people."

Gentlemen, read this with attention; and, when you have so done, draw yourselves the contrast which the situation of England now presents with that of France! It is a fact perfectly notorious, that there is no such thing as paper-money in France; it is also notorious, that not only does France abound in gold coin, but that the coin of this country, the guineas of England, are now gone and are daily going to France; aye, to that same country, which was to be ruined and overcome and subdued by the failure of its finances! This speech of Lord Wellesley, and all the numerous other speeches of the same description, were intended for the purpose of gaining the people's concurrence to the prosecution of the *Anti-jacobin war*, which war, by adding five hundred millions sterling to our Debt, has produced the fruit of which we are now about to taste. Year after year the same means were made use of for the same purpose, and with similar success. At the opening of the Session of Parliament, in October, 1796, PITT himself told the Honourable House, that, *in his conscience*, he believed, that, with finances so dilapidated, the French would not be able to stand out another campaign! "This DEPRECIATION of the Assignats," said he, "is so severely felt, that it has been repeatedly admitted, that means must be found to employ resources less wasteful. This principle has been recognized by every financier or statesman. Even at the period when the depreciation was only one half, it was declared, that, unless some immediate remedy was applied, they would be unable to maintain their armies. Months have since elapsed, and no substitute has been employed. Resources thus strained to their utmost pitch, and incapable of any renovation, must have in themselves the seeds of decay, and the cause of inevitable dissolution."

This, Gentlemen, was PITT's reasoning as applied to France. Little did that presumptuous and shallow man dream, that, in less than four months from that very day, he was doomed to come into that same House of Commons, and from the same spot where he then stood, announce that the Bank of England was no longer able to

pay its notes in the coin of the realm, and that he had been guilty of a violation of the law in issuing an Order of Council to guarantee the Bank Company against the consequences of refusing to pay the debts due to their creditors! But, as if this were not enough, he must, in the speech just referred to, comment upon certain *metallic money* then, it was said, about to be issued in France. "Metallic pieces," said he, "are, it seems, to be put in circulation; but it is not said, whether these are to be of the DENOMINATED VALUE: if not so, they are only METALLIC ASSIGNATS!" Yet this same minister, who has been impudently called "the great Statesman now no more," had, in a short time afterwards, to propose to this same House of Commons, to sanction the issuing of Dollars at 4s. and 9d. the real value of which was 4s. 4½d.; he lived long enough to propose to the same House of Commons, to give its sanction to an issue of dollars at 5s.; if he had lived till now, (I always regret that he did not!) he would have seen the Dollar at 5s. 6d. And, what he would have seen it at, if he had lived till *a few years hence*, I must leave TIME, the *trier* of all things, the rewarder of all good deeds, and the *avenger* of all injuries, to say.

You will now be able to judge how far our situation, in respect to paper-money, resembles that of France at the time when the revolutionary rulers of that country were endeavouring to keep up the Assignats by the arm of the law, by the terrors of the jail and the guillotine. Mr. PERCEVAL says that there is *no resemblance whatever* between the bank notes and the assignats. I shall shew you, that Mr. Perceval is deceived; that he does not understand this matter; and that, if he had read the works of PAINE, at the time when his colleague Lord Eldon (then Attorney General) was prosecuting the author, he would not have hazarded any such assertion.

But, we must now take a look at the whole of this speech of Mr. Perceval. I mean his speech in the House of Commons, on Tuesday last, the 9th instant, upon the first reading of Lord Stanhope's Bill in the House of Commons. This speech will be a memorable one. The child yet unborn will have cause to think of this speech, and of the series of measures, of which, as appears to me, it is the necessary forerunner.

Mr. Perceval (I have the report of his speech as given in the COURIER) began by stating his reasons for having come round to the support of Lord Stanhope's Bill, after having, at first, disapproved of it. He says, that he, at first, thought it *unnecessary*, because he did not think, that any body would follow the example of Lord King; but, that finding that it was likely, that the example would be followed, he then thought it necessary to support the bill. Thus, then, at any rate, it has been *one individual* who has caused this bill; the bill is made for the purpose of preventing that individual and others from obtaining in payment of rent what the law now authorizes them to demand; it is a bill, in fact, which, against the will of one of the parties at least, *alters contracts* made years ago. Yes, says Mr. Perceval, it does so; but, *the same was done in 1797!* That is the *answer*. Because the thing was done by Pitt, he may do it! He said, that, until now, this preference for coin before paper had been shown by none but *Pedlars, Jews, and Smugglers*; and, in speaking, afterwards, about the possibility of the Bill being inefficient, and a legal tender being necessary, he said, that he did, however, "*hope*, that the ODIUM attaching to the conduct which gave rise to this Bill, WOULD PREVENT OTHERS FROM FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE." These are memorable words, especially considering from whom they came. Aye, aye! I know well what workings of mind there must have been before they were uttered. I would not have such workings in my mind for ten times the worth of the *reversion* of Lord Arden's sinecure. Oh! a time is coming, when all these things will be seen and felt as they ought to be.

But, let us return to this memorable expression: "the ODIUM!" A man, then, is, it seems, to incur *odium* if he demand his *due*; his due in *equity* as well as in *law*! Gentlemen, you are, for the most part, *tenants*; but, take care how you suffer yourselves to be led to wish for any advantage from this Bill, which will most assuredly operate, in the end, to your injury, and perhaps, to your utter ruin. Let me explain to you, a little more fully than I have hitherto done, the nature of Lord King's demand upon his tenants. He let a farm, for instance, in 1802, to JOHN STILES for £.100 a year, in good and lawful money of the realm. He has, until

now, in bank notes, full of sunk, instead of only likely, bly, the care thing, larly sells for I again you caus cattl tion. paper five and a loa four but £.10 fair, King as If he on d that more Aye than And this jews to be conc shall Lord or t best give one them own deno in t Cler then reas have The betw whar is th God,

now, continued to take the £.100 a year in bank notes; but now he finds, that those notes are so far from being good and lawful money of the realm, that they have sunk in value 20 per centum, and that, instead of £.100 he would, in effect, get only £.80. If, however, the thing was likely to stop where it is, he might possibly go on receiving paper to the end of the present leases, when he would take care to raise his rent of course; but, the thing is not likely to stop; it goes regularly on; gold is purchased up; a guinea sells for 27s. 6d. And is it not, then, time for Lord King to begin to protect himself against this depreciation? JOHN STILES, you see, suffers no hardship in this, because he raises the price of his corn and cattle to meet the effects of the depreciation. Suppose, for instance, that the paper has depreciated 20 per centum, or five pounds in every twenty, since 1802; and suppose, that wheat is now 25 pounds a load; consequently, it will require only four loads of wheat to pay £.100 now, but it must have required five loads to pay £.100 in 1802. But, is it not just and fair, that JOHN STILES should give Lord King as much wheat for his rent in 1811 as he contracted to give him in 1802? If he does not do this, and if the paper go on depreciating, may it not come to pass, that JOHN STILES will not give Lord King more than a bushel of wheat in a year? Aye, may it; and a great deal sooner too than many persons seem to imagine. And, because Lord King wishes to avoid this ruin is he to be lumped along with jews, pedlars, and smugglers, and are we to be told of the odium attaching to his conduct? However, upon this head, I shall always say, for my part, that the Lords are the best judges of whether they or their tenants are likely to make the best use of the rents; and, if they like to give the rents to the tenants, I know of no one who has any right to find fault with them. They and the other great land-owners appear to have abundant confidence in Mr. Perceval, in the Bank, and in the East India Company; and the Clergy appear to have equal confidence in them. Well, then; I really see no good reason that we, the people in general, have to find fault with what is going on. The matter seems, I think, to lie wholly between the land-owners and this little sharp gentleman and his colleagues; and to them I will leave it, being quite satisfied, that the former are now about enjoy-

ing the just reward of their conduct for the last twenty-six years.

Mr. Perceval said, that those who supported the Bank Restriction Act in 1797 were inconsistent in not supporting this Bill; and he talked a great deal about the inconsistency of those who proposed, the other day, to continue the Restriction for two years longer. With these matters, Gentlemen, WE have nothing to do. The affair is all *their own*. THEY made the war that produced the loans that produced the paper that produced the run that produced the stoppage of cash payments that produced the depreciation that produced the sale of guineas and the hoarding and exportation of them. THEIR work the whole of it is, and which set of them were first at it, or which last, is of no consequence to us. They have it all amongst them. They chose the grounds of war, and the time for beginning; they put down all those who opposed them; they have been, for 26 years, the rulers of the country and the masters of all its resources. One set, therefore, is, and ought to be, just the same as the other in the eyes of the people. Let them settle the matter of precedence between them; let them bait one another as long as they please; but let not us be, by such baiting, amused and drawn away from the great points at issue.

The "object of the bill," Mr. Perceval said, "was to prevent the establishment of TWO PRICES, which must be the case if Lord King's example were generally followed." Now, you will be so good as to bear in mind, Gentlemen, that this is, Mr. Perceval says, the object of the Bill; and, I beg you also to bear in mind, that I say, that in this object the Bill will fail. Here we are, then, I and the Minister, foot to foot in opposition. I say his scheme will not prevent the TWO PRICES. I say it will not: he says that such is its object: we shall see who is right. He ought to be; for, I am sure, he is paid money enough for thinking for this most thinking people in the world. He did, however, confess, that it was possible, that this bill might not be efficient; and, what was then to be done? Why, the bank notes, he said, must, in that case, be made a legal tender! Bravo! Come: to't again! Once more, and then comes the maximum! I always said, that it would be thus. I always said, that the moment any one put the paper-money to the test, the paper-

money would be made a legal tender. This Bill it was (but I do not believe it now is) believed would have the same effect; but, if it fail of that effect, then the legal tender is, it seems, to come.

Mr. Perceval says, that this may become *necessary*. For *what*, Mr. Perceval? *What* may it become *necessary* for? *Necessary to do what*, thou Minister of Finance? Why, you will say, I suppose, to prevent TWO PRICES, and to PROTECT THE FUNDHOLDER. And, dost thou really think; dost thou, a disciple of the great statesman now no more, think, in good earnest, that a legal tender law would *prevent two prices* and *protect the fund-holder*? Forgive me, but, it is impossible for me to refrain from laughing at the idea. You will say, I suppose, that it is "no laughing matter." Cry, then, if you like, but I will not; nor will any one belonging to me. But, how is the *legal tender* to prevent TWO PRICES being made? An act of parliament, making the bank notes a legal tender, would cause *debts* to be paid in paper; but, it could not make the Butcher or the Baker give their meat or bread for bank notes. They would and they must and they will have two prices; a money price and a paper price; and this will become general in spite of every thing that can be done to oppose it. What *protection*, then, will the fund-holder, or "*public creditor*," as he is called, to derive from measures like these? Mr. Perceval supposes a case (of which I will say more by-and-bye) in which the fundholder of 6,000*l.* capital rents a house of 300*l.* a year, and says that it would be *extremely hard*, if this man, who is obliged to receive his 300*l.* a year from the government in *paper*, were to be left exposed to the compulsion of paying his 300*l.* a year rent in gold. Where is the *hardship*, if bank notes are *as good as gold*? Where is the *hardship*, if the notes have *not depreciated*? And these assertions are daily and hourly made. But, to return to the Baker and Butcher, for these are the lads that it will be most difficult to manage; what will this fund-holder do with *them*? How will Mr. Perceval *protect him against them*? Why, to be sure, he will, and indeed, consistently, he must, have recourse to *maximum*. And, it may not be amiss here to explain to you *farmers and tradesmen* what a *maximum* means; for, you will find it a matter, in which you are very deeply interested.

They had a *maximum* in France, in the times of depreciated paper-money. The rulers of that day, finding the assignats depreciate very fast, passed a law to put a stop to the depreciation, which only made them depreciate the faster; and, as the assignats were *bought and sold*, as our bank paper now is, they passed another law to prevent the gold from passing for *more* than its nominal worth and to prevent the paper to pass for *less* than its nominal worth. This object, though attempted to be accomplished by the means of very severe penalties, was not accomplished. There was still a *money price* and a *paper price*; for, when a man went to market, he pulled out his paper, or his coin; and, the article was *high or low* priced accordingly. If the thing to be bought was a quarter of mutton, for instance, a *crown piece* in silver might be the price; but, if the payment was to be made with paper, then the price might be *ten pounds or fifty pounds*, perhaps. The next thing, therefore, was to *prohibit the use of coin* altogether. But, this did not answer the purpose. The assignats still kept depreciating, and the rate of depreciation kept on increasing, till at last, it required a *hundred pounds to purchase a pair of common shoes*; and, this was not at all wonderful; for, when once a paper-money is got into a state of acknowledged and notorious depreciation, it always goes on with *accelerated velocity*. Well, what was now to be done? If it took a hundred pounds to purchase a pair of common shoes, what was the use of *collecting taxes* in such money? And what was to become of those whose incomes, founded on former contracts, were paid them in such money? What was the government to do? Why, to fix a *price upon all the necessities of life*, and to *compel people to sell their goods at those prices*. This was done, and all Farmers, Bakers, Butchers, and others, were compelled to sell their commodities at the same price, in assignats, as they used to sell them at in money, before any assignats were made. The consequence of this was, that those who had corn or meat or other necessities, did not bring them to market; the shop-keepers shut up their shops, or hid their goods. To counteract this, a law was passed to punish *monopolists*, and every man who kept more corn, meat, or necessities of any sort, in his house, than was absolutely necessary for the use of his own family, became a *monopolist*, and, in many cases, such per-

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sons were punished with *death*! This was the last of that series of measures, which was adopted in France during the reign of terror and blood. The guillotine was continually at work to enforce this last measure. The market place in every considerable town reeked with human blood. Hundreds of thousands of innocent country people and shop-keepers perished upon the scaffold and in prison in consequence of the laws made for the purpose of sustaining a depreciated paper-money in France; and, wherever a similar project is attempted to be forced into execution, similar consequences will follow.

At last, however, the people of France, unable to endure so hellish a system any longer, put an end to it and to its authors. The paper-money was *totally annihilated*, and, in a short time, gold and silver came back into circulation. But, in the mean while, what *protection* did any of these measures give to the man of *fixed income*, who might be compared to our fundholder? How did he get any *protection* from any of these measures? Yet, he got full as much as the fund-holder in England will get from this measure of Mr. Perceval, who, though he may, in part, ruin the land-owner, will not, thereby, do the fund-holder the smallest good. The *rent of the fund-holder's house* is the least article of his yearly expences. His servants, his upholsterer, his butcher, his baker, his haberdasher, his draper, his brewer, his wine-merchant, &c. &c. will all be paid in gold, or in paper upon the principle of TWO PRICES. There is, therefore, no means of protecting the fundholder against these gentlemen, except the *maximum*. It is useless to talk about it, and for people to attempt to buoy themselves up with a sort of vague notion of the impossibility that an English ministry should ever do what was done by Robespierre. I hope they never will, indeed; but, this I am sure of, that, without doing what was done by Robespierre, they cannot make the fund-holder's income equal in value to gold and silver. This is what Mr. Perceval wishes to do; this is what he calls *protecting* the fund-holder, and this would be protecting him; but this, I tell him, he cannot do, nor can all the powers on earth do it. To stop where we are is within the scope of possibility. By an immediate stop to the increase of the National Debt and Dividends; by an immediate stop to Loans and issues of Exchequer Bills; by an immediate reduction of the Taxes; by

such means, *immediately* adopted, we might stop where we are; but, to *restore* is impossible. To make the dividends worth their nominal amount in gold and silver is no more possible than it is to bring back yesterday.

When I closed my last Letter, I thought that, in this, I should have been able to conclude the discussion; but, the debate in the House of Commons has created new matter, and, as I wish to see the event of the Bill now before that House, before I take my leave of the subject, I must defer the conclusion till next week.

In the mean while,

I remain, Gentlemen,

Your friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 12th July, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—THE WAR. — *Dispatch from Lord Wellington, June 6th.*

(Concluded from p. 32.)

Notwithstanding that these works have been carried on with great rapidity, I am happy to say they are themselves so complete, and the communication from one to the other so well assured, that our loss hitherto throughout the siege has been very small. I am sorry to say that Lieutenant Hawker, of the Royal Artillery, an Officer who has distinguished himself in these operations, was killed this morning.

The enemy have hitherto made no movement to disturb our operations; but I understand that three battalions were moved from the blockade of Cadiz in the last days of May; and I have received a report, that the battalions of the 9th corps, destined to reinforce the Army of the South, were to arrive at Cordova on the 5th or 6th of this month.

The Army of Portugal likewise broke up from the Tormes on the 3d instant, and their first march was in the direction of the passage of the Tagus.

I have received a letter from Mr. Wellesley of the 4th instant, from which I learn that General Suchet had invested Tarragona.—I have, &c.

(Signed) WELLINGTON.

SPAIN.—*Marshal Beresford to his Army.*—
Albuera, 31st May, 1811.

His Excellency the Marshal, having on the 17th published an order, thanking the troops for their good conduct in defeating and repulsing the enemy in the battle of the 16th, could not help directing himself in particular to the British and Portuguese troops, who more immediately served under his orders on that day, which conferred such honour on all the troops that took part in it.—The Marshal almost finds himself necessitated to limit himself to generally thanking the officers and soldiers, seeing how difficult it is to make distinctions, when all, and each one in particular, well and nobly conducted himself. His Excellency can only applaud and give thanks to all the corps of Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, that were under his command in that battle, in which the honour of their respective countries was nobly maintained. Valour was seconded by discipline, and victory was the result.—The Marshal acknowledges his thanks to be especially due to Major-General Cole; and considers that Major-Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, by his very great services, contributed greatly to the fortunate success of that day; his Excellency begs him to accept his thanks.—The Marshal feels the misfortune which befel the first brigade of the 2nd division, it was gallantly engaged under its valourous Commandant, in using that truly British weapon the bayonet; but in that moment it was attacked in the rear by the enemy's cavalry, whose approach, in consequence of the heavy rain and bad state of the atmosphere, was not perceived, and all their efforts rendered abortive. His Excellency is satisfied with this brigade; the 2d and 3d brigades of the same division, particularly merit the thanks of the Marshal, who joins in the sentiments of sorrow, caused to all the officers and soldiers, by the loss which they have suffered in officers and soldiers, and particularly by the death of Major Gen. Houghton, and Lieut. Col. Duckworth: it will console them to know, that they rest in the tomb of honour, dying in the most noble of causes, and were fully revenged by the soldiers who survived them. Colonel Inglis, of the 57th, Lieut.-Col. Abercrombie, and Major L'Estrange, likewise deserve to be particularized in the Marshal's thanks. His Excellency laments with the Fuzileer Brigade, the loss of its valiant Commander,

Lieut.-Col. Sir W. Myers, and thanks it for the share it had in the success of that day; he gives his particular thanks to Lieut.-Gen. Alten, and the light brigade of the King's German Legion, under his orders. The dispositions of the General, and the conduct of the officers and soldiers, were every thing his Excellency could wish. Major-General Hamilton and the Portuguese troops merit every praise; discipline was all that their natural valour required to place them on a level with the best troops, to which class they now actually belong. Great praise is due to Brigadier General Harvey, and the brigade under his command, for its conduct, and the firmness with which it repulsed the attack of the French cavalry. The Marshal also renders his thanks to the brigades of Brigadier General Tonseau, and Brigadier General Campbell, as also to the brigade of Colonel Collins, and he feels with the utmost regret the misfortune which befel the latter officer.—The Marshal likewise gives his thanks to Major-General the Honourable William Lumley, for the able manner in which he manœuvred the allied cavalry against the much superior number by which he was opposed, preventing the enemy from obtaining his object. The officers and soldiers of the cavalry have an equal right to the thanks of the Marshal for their firm deportment, which overawed the enemy, and prevented him, notwithstanding his superiority, from attempting any thing against it. The Marshal must also speak with praise of Brigadier-General Long, and the Hon. Colonel Gray, for the part which they took in directing the cavalry; as also of Colonel Otway, for the dispositions which he made to cover the left of the line. Major Hostaman, Major Dixon, and the officers and soldiers of the British, Germans, and Portuguese artillery, deserve the greatest praise, and the Marshal accordingly gives them his thanks.—The Marshal well knows that every officer and soldier deserves to be named in particular, the conduct of all has been most valiant and noble, and never were given greater proofs of brilliant British valour. The Portuguese also shewed, that in the field of battle they are capable of emulating the allies whom they love.—The Marshal gives his thanks to all the officers of his Staff, and particularly to Brigadier-General D'Urban, Quarter-master-general of the army, who so much contributed to the success of the

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day; to Brigadier-General Mozinho, Lieutenant-Colonel Rook, Lieutenant-Colonel Harding, and to the officers of the Deputy and Adjutant-General and Quarter-Master-General. He likewise gives his thanks to Brig.-Gen. Leries, and to the officers of the present Staff of his Excellency, for the aid which he received from them.—Soldiers, you have fought, *and reduced to shameful flight, a haughty and vain-glorious enemy, and covered yourselves with true glory.* The victories which the British troops have gained over the enemy are as many as the battles they have fought. (Signed) Rook, T. C. A. G.

SPAIN.—*The Duke of Dalmatia to his army, 9th June, 1811.*

“Fellow Soldiers!—A month has not elapsed since your arms were crowned with triumph on the plains of Albuera, and since the enemy trembled at the thunder of your artillery. Discomfited they fled, and left their cannon and their standards in your possession. Soon you shall have another opportunity of displaying your valour, if the English will venture to give it you, and, with another glorious and decisive victory, you shall terminate the war in the Peninsula.—Badajoz, besieged on every side; bombarded without intermission during twelve successive days and nights, and surrounded by enemies for nearly two months, has bravely resisted every effort—still will the noble garrison disappoint the intentions of the foe, and reply to their summonses from the mouth of the cannon, returning defiance for the empty threats of the assailants. Marshal Beresford and all his Portuguese were unequal to accomplish its fall. The aid of the British Commander in Chief will also be ineffectual, and if by delays, retreats, and manœuvres of every kind, they may avert the blow for a time, yet it must and shall fall, and with such a weight as to crush our opponents.—Comrades, in this conflict the British are not the greatest sufferers?—No. It is the unhappy Portuguese nation that is borne down by the burden of affliction. A people whom the Emperor wishes to make truly happy—a people possessing within themselves all means of felicity—a people who wish to retain those blessings?—but a people deceived, betrayed, insulted, ruined, and trampled upon—not by us who are mis-called invaders, but by the English, the

real invaders of Portugal and Spain.—That people now see their error, but too late. They now know their friends, and would willingly stretch forth the hand of peace, but it is withered by the machinations of England.—Let us then, my countrymen, avenge their cause. Let us be the advocates of the oppressed, not by words but by deeds. Already we are in a situation to meet the English, if they dare to accept our defiance. They will not while they can avoid it; but it will soon be out of their power to refuse; and they shrink in vain from that blow, which they have neither the strength to meet, nor the resolution to oppose.

Marshal Duke of DALMATIA.”

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.—*Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Viscount Talavera to the Earl of Liverpool, dated, Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811, giving an Account of the raising of the Siege of Badajoz; and inclosing a Copy of a Letter from General Spencer, giving an Account of his evacuation of Almeida.—Published in London, 6th July, 1811.*

In consequence of a report from the Chief Engineer, Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, that the fire from St. Christoval might occasion the loss of many lives in the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and the breach in that out-work having been apparently much improved by the fire throughout the 6th, I directed that an attempt might be made to carry St. Christoval by storm that night. Major-General Houstoun, who conducted the operations of the siege on the right of the Guadiana, accordingly ordered a detachment under Major Mackintosh, of the 85th regiment, to make the attempt. The men advanced under a very heavy fire of musketry and hand-grenades from the out-work, and of shot and shells from the town, with the utmost intrepidity, and in the best order, to the bottom of the breach; the advanced guard being led by Ensign Dyas, of the 51st regiment, who volunteered to perform this duty; but they found that the enemy had cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp; and notwithstanding that they were provided with ladders, it was impossible to mount it. They retired with some loss. The fire upon St. Christoval, as well as upon the place, continued on the 7th, 8th, and 9th, on which the breach in the wall of St. Christoval appeared practicable, and

I directed that a second attempt should be made on that night to obtain possession of that out-work. Major-General Houstoun ordered another detachment for this service, under the command of Major Macgeachy, of the 17th Portuguese regiment, who, with the officers destined to command the different parties composing the detachment, had been employed throughout the 8th and 9th in reconnoitering the breach, and the different approaches to it. They advanced at about nine at night in the best order, though opposed by the same means and with the same determination as had been opposed to the detachment which had made the attempt on the 6th. Ensign Dyas again led the advance, and the storming party arrived at the foot of the breach; but they found it impossible to mount it, the enemy having again cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp. The detachment suffered considerably, and Major Macgeachy, the commanding officer, was unfortunately killed, and others of the officers fell; but the troops continued to maintain their station till Major-General Houstoun ordered them to retire. When the reinforcements had arrived from the frontiers of Castile, after the battle of Albuera, I undertook the siege of Badajos, entertaining a belief that the means of which I had the command would reduce the place before the end of the second week in June; at which time I expected that the reinforcements for the enemy's southern army, detached from Castile, would join Marshal Soult. I was unfortunately mistaken in my estimate of the quality of those means. We had failed in two attempts to obtain possession of fort St. Christoval, and it was obvious to me that we could not obtain possession of that out-work, without performing a work which would have required the labour of several days to complete. On the morning of the 10th instant, I received the inclosed intercepted dispatch from the Duke of Dalmatia to the Duke of Ragusa, which pointed out clearly the enemy's design to collect in Estremadura their whole force; and I had reason to believe that Drouet's corps, which had marched from Toledo on the 28th and 29th of May, and was expected at Cordova on the 5th and 6th instant, would have joined the southern army by the 10th; and it was generally expected in the country, that the southern army would have moved by that time. The movement of this army alone would

have created a necessity for raising the siege; but on the same morning I received accounts from the frontiers of Castile, which left no doubt of the destination of the army of Portugal to the southward, and gave ground for belief that they would arrive at Merida on the 15th inst. I therefore ordered that the siege might be raised. I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the officers and troops employed at the siege of Badajoz, whose labours and exertions deserved a very different result. Major General Picton directed the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and Major-General Houstoun on the right; and I am much indebted to these officers, as well as to Major-General Hamilton, and the other General and Staff-officers, and the officers and troops under their commands respectively. Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, of the Royal Engineers, was the directing engineer, and immediately superintended the operations on the left of the Guadiana; and Captain Squires those on the right of that river; and those officers and the corps of Engineers have by their conduct on this occasion augmented their claims to my approbation. Lieut.-Colonel Framingham commanded the artillery, having under his orders Major Dickson attached to the Portuguese service, who during the absence of Lieut.-Colonel Framingham with the troops which were employed to cover the operations, conducted all the details of this important department. I had every reason to be satisfied with these officers, and most particularly with Major Dickson, from whose activity, zeal, and intelligence the public service has derived great advantages in the different operations against Badajoz. Captain Cleves, of the Hanoverian Artillery, conducted that department on the right of the Guadiana with great success. The service of the batteries was performed by detachments from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd regiments of Portuguese artillery, who conducted themselves remarkably well. They were aided by Captain Rainsford's company of the Royal Artillery, who were indefatigable; some of them having never quitted the batteries. I am much indebted to General Leite, the Governor of the Province of Alentejo and of Elvas, for the assistance which he again afforded me in this operation. I inclose a return of the killed and wounded throughout the siege, from which your Lordship will observe that, excepting in the attempts to obtain possession of

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St. Christoval, our loss has not been severe. We still maintain the blockade of Badajoz. I have not yet heard that the enemy have moved from their position at Llerena, and I imagine that the arrival of the 9th corps has been delayed longer than was expected; and it is probable that Soult will be unwilling to move till he will hear of the movements of the army of Portugal. They broke up from the Tormes on the 3rd, and their advanced guard arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo on the evening of the 5th. The moved forward again on the 6th, and Lieut.-General Sir Brent Spencer withdrew the advanced guard of the troops under his command, first to the Nave d'Aver, and then to Alfayates. The enemy patrolled on the 6th into Fuentes de Honor and into Nave d'Aver. I enclose Sir Brent Spencer's report of these operations, from which it appears that the Royal Dragoons, under Lieut.-Colonel Clifton, and a troop of the 14th, the whole directed by Major-General Slade, distinguished themselves. I imagine that the enemy's march in this direction was intended as a reconnoissance, and to cover the march of a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo; as on the following day, the 7th, the whole moved from thence to Moras Verdes, in the direction of the pass of Banos, near which pass Gen. Regnier had been with two divisions of the army of Portugal, since the 5th. On the 8th, in the evening, one division of General Regnier's troops had come through Banos, and I expect that those divisions will have arrived at Placentia the 9th, and the whole army on the 10th.—P. S. Since writing this dispatch, I have received accounts that General Drouet's troops joined on the enemy's right at Berlunza and Azuga yesterday, and a report that their cavalry were in movement towards Los Santos this morning. The British cavalry, and the 2nd and 4th divisions, were about to march from Villa Franca and Almendralejo towards Albuera, and I have ordered there General Hamilton's division and shall proceed there this night myself, if I should find that report confirmed.

Total of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. at the Siege of Badajoz, from the 30th of May to the 5th of June, both days inclusive.

Royal Artillery—1 Lieutenant killed; 2 rank and file wounded.

2d Batt. 5th Foot—1 Lieutenant, 3 rank and file, killed; 1 serjeant, 3 rank and file, wounded.

7th Fusileers—2 rank and file wounded, 2d Batt. 39th Foot—2 rank and file wounded.

1st Batt. 40th Foot—1 rank and file killed.

1st Batt. 45th Foot—3 rank and file wounded.

2d Batt. 48th Foot—1 rank and file wounded.

51st Foot—9 rank and file wounded.

1st Batt. 57th Foot—1 Ensign, 1 rank and file wounded.

2d Batt. 66th Foot—2 rank and file killed.

74th Foot—2 rank and file killed; 1 serjeant, 6 rank and file wounded.

2d Batt. 83d Foot—1 serjeant, 3 rank and file, wounded.

85th Foot—1 rank and file killed; 3 rank and file wounded.

1st Batt. 88th Foot—1 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.

94th Foot—2 rank and file wounded.

Chasseurs Britanniques—3 rank and file killed; 5 rank and file wounded; 2 rank and file missing.

Detachments 1st and 2d Light Battalions of the King's German Legion—1 rank and file wounded.

Brunswick Oels—4 rank and file wounded.

Total British Loss—2 Lieutenants, 13 rank and file, killed; 1 ensign, 3 serjeants, 48 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file, missing.

Total Portuguese Loss—1 Lieutenant, 20 rank and file, killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 1 Major, 1 Lieutenant, 2 ensigns, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 63 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file, missing.

Total Loss—3 Lieutenants, 33 rank and file, killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 1 Major, 1 Lieutenant, 3 ensigns, 4 serjeants, 1 drummer, 111 rank and file, wounded; 4 rank and file, missing.

(Signed) CHARLES STEWART.

Major-Gen. and Adj. Gen.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, at the Siege of Badajoz, from the 30th of May to the 5th of June, inclusive.

Killed.

Royal British Foot Artillery—Lieutenant Edmund Hawker.

2d Batt. 5th Foot—Lieutenant Sedgwick.

2d Portuguese Regiment of the Line—
Lieutenant Rodrigo de Mello.

Wounded.

1st Batt. 57th Foot—Ensign Leslie.

Portuguese Artillery—Lieutenant Joze
Baptista de Silva Lopez.

14th Portuguese Regiment—Lieutenant
Colonel Oliver, severely.

21st Ditto—Major Gomes, Ensign Joze
Vicente.

*Total of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of
the Army under the Command of Lieute-
nant General Lord Viscount Wellington,
K. B. at the Siege of Badajoz, from the
6th to the 11th of June, 1811.*

Royal Engineers—1 Lieutenant killed;
1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, wounded.

Royal Staff Corps—1 Lieutenant
wounded.

2d Batt. 5th Foot—2 rank and file,
killed; 1 serjeant, 1 rank and file,
wounded.

7th Fusileers—2 rank and file wounded.

29th Foot—1 rank and file wounded.

1st Batt. 45th Foot—1 rank and file
killed; 4 rank and file wounded.

51st Foot—1 Lieutenant, 26 rank and
file, killed; 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 3
serjeants, 63 rank and file, wounded; 4
rank and file missing.

1st Batt. 57th Foot—1 Ensign missing.

74th Foot—2 rank and file killed; 2 rank
and file wounded.

2d Batt. 83d Foot—1 serjeant, 5 rank
and file, wounded.

85th Foot—1 Lieutenant, 6 rank and
file, killed; 3 Lieutenants, 3 serjeants, 13
rank and file, wounded; 1 Captain missing.

1st Batt. 38th Foot—5 rank and file
wounded.

94th Foot—1 rank and file killed; 6
rank and file wounded.

Chasseurs Britanniques—1 serjeant, 8
rank and file, killed; 1 Lieutenant, 17
rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file
missing.

Detachments 1st and 2d Light Batt.
King's German Legion—1 rank and file
killed; 1 rank and file wounded.

Duke of Brunswick's Corps—1 rank and
file killed; 1 Lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 7
rank and file, wounded.

British Artillery—2 rank and file
wounded.

Portuguese Artillery—6 rank and file,
killed; 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 28 rank
and file, wounded.

*Total British Loss—3 lieutenants, 1 ser-
jeant, 48 rank and file, killed; 2 captains,*

*9 lieutenants, 9 serjeants, 127 rank and
file, wounded; 1 captain, 1 ensign, 6 rank
and file, missing.*

*Total Portuguese Loss—1 major, 2 lie-
utenants, 2 serjeants, 25 rank and file,
killed; 2 captains, 2 lieutenants, 1 ensign,
4 serjeants, 76 rank and file, wounded; 1
captain missing.*

*General Total—1 major, 5 lieutenants,
3 serjeants, 73 rank and file killed; 4
captains, 11 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 13 ser-
jeants, 203 rank and file, wounded; 2
captains, 1 ensign, 6 rank and file, missing.*

*Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and
Missing, at the Siege of Badajoz, from
the 6th to the 11th of June, 1811, in-
clusive.*

Killed.

Royal Engineers—Lieutenant Hunt.

51st Foot—Lieutenant Westropp.

85th Foot—Lieutenant Hogg.

7th Portuguese Regiment of the Line—
Lieutenant Joze Pereirra.

17th Ditto—Major M'Geachy (11th
British regiment.)

19th Ditto—Lieutenant Joze D'Mea-
nera.

Wounded.

Royal Engineers—Captain Patton, se-
verely; Lieut. Forster, severely, since
dead.

Royal Staff Corps—Lieut. Westmacott,
severely.

51st Foot—Captain Smellie, Lieutenants
Beardsley and Hicks, all severely.

85th Foot—Lieutenants Gammell, Grant
and Morton, all slightly.

Chasseurs Britanniques—Lieutenant Du-
fief, severely.

Duke of Brunswick's Light Infantry—
Lieutenant Lyznewsy, slightly.

17th Portuguese Regiment of the Line
—Captain Maxwell, severely; Lieut. Jose
Fortio, slightly; Ensign J. Antonio Bo-
gueuse, severely.

3d Portuguese Regiment of Artillery—
Captain Velez Barreiros, slightly; Lieut.
Baptista Lopez, severely.

Missing.

1st Batt. 57th Foot—Ensign Leslie.

85th Foot—Captain Nixon.

19th Portuguese Regiment of the Line
—Captain Budd.

Soito, June 7, 1811:

My Lord,—In my letter of the 5th in-
stant from Villa Formosa, I did myself the
honour of acquainting your Lordship,
that I had just returned from the heights

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in front of Gallegos, from whence I discovered a body of the enemy of about 8,000 men, consisting of 500 cavalry and 2,500 infantry, with artillery, entering Ciudad Rodrigo from the Salamanca road. I requested Col. Waters to remain on the heights until sunset, to notice whether any more of the enemy followed those which I have mentioned, and he reported to me that they were succeeded by another column; but I have strong reason to think, from what I shall relate to your Lordship, that they must have marched large bodies of infantry and cavalry into Ciudad Rodrigo in the course of the night. According to your Lordship's instructions I concentrated the troops rather more in their cantonments, upon hearing a few days before, that the enemy were moving in the direction of Ciudad Rodrigo, and took the other necessary precautions for falling back. The enemy advanced, as I thought it probable, at day-break on the morning of the 6th, in two columns; one taking the direction of Gallegos, and the other that of Carpio and Espeja. The former was a heavy column of cavalry and infantry, with several guns, and the latter consisted of about 6,000 infantry; but in saying this, I should observe, that, from the nature of the country, the rear of these columns could not be discovered. They had also upwards of 2,000 cavalry and 10 guns, which moved across the plain in front of Fuentes de Honor. From the nature of the country being so perfectly open, and the probability of the enemy bringing a large portion of his cavalry upon this point, I deemed it most prudent to withdraw the light division under Brigadier General Craufurd, which accordingly fell back from Gallegos and Espeja, at two o'clock in the morning, upon Nave d'Aver. Observing the rapidity of the enemy's advance, and the superior number of his cavalry, the light division, with the horse artillery attached to them, was directed to retire farther back upon Alfayates, the first and fifth divisions gradually falling back from Aldea de Ponte and Nave d'Aver to the heights just behind Soito, and the sixth division from Mealhada de Sordo to Rendo, the cavalry remaining in front of Alfayates.—It is with great pleasure I have to mention the very admirable conduct of the Royals, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Clifton, and one troop of the 14th Light Dragoons, which being all that were employed in covering the front from Villa de Egua

to Espeja, were assembled at Gallegos, and retreated from thence agreeably to my directions. The force to which they were opposed your Lordship is in possession of in this letter; and notwithstanding all the efforts of General Montbrun, who commanded the French cavalry, to outflank the British, pressing them at the same time in front with eight pieces of cannon, their retiring to Nave d'Aver merits the highest admiration. In offering my sense of their conduct, and of the very stubborn manner in which they retired, I derive very great satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship, that Major-General Slade directed in person the whole of the affair, and by his movements foiled the designs of the enemy, and the British cavalry maintained as usual their high character. The Major-General in his report to me speaks in much praise of Major Dorville, of the Royal Dragoons, of Captain Purvis, of the same regiment, and of Captain Dowson, of the 14th Light Dragoons, who had opportunities of distinguishing themselves much.—I am not able to judge exactly of the designs of the enemy, but I know that they left Salamanca with 18,000 infantry, and with upwards of 3,000 cavalry, and 34 pieces of artillery, on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. In concluding my statement of the movements of yesterday, I beg leave to add my acknowledgments for the choice made by your Lordship, of the Hon. Colonel Pakenham, and of Lieutenant-Colonel Delancey, at the head of their respective departments, with this portion of the army; their zeal and good judgment is already known to your Lordship. The loss of the cavalry upon this occasion, I am happy to say, amounted to no more than ten rank and file wounded, and nine missing; and six horses killed, ten wounded and four missing.—I have the honour to be, &c. B. SPENCER, Lieut.-Gen.

FRANCE.—*Exposition of the State of the Empire, presented to the Legislative Body at its sitting of June 29, by his Excellency Count Montalivet, Minister for the Interior.*

GENTLEMEN,—Since your last Session, the Empire has received an addition of sixteen departments, five millions of people, a territory yielding a revenue of one hundred millions, three hundred leagues of coast, with all their maritime means. The mouths of the Rhine, the Meuse, and

the Scheldt, were not then French: the circulation of the interior of the Empire was circumscribed; the productions of its central departments could not reach the sea unless they were submitted to the inspection of foreign custom houses. These inconveniencies have for ever disappeared. The maritime arsenal of the Scheldt, whereon so many hopes are founded, has thereby received all the developement which it needed. The mouths of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, place in our hands all the wood which Germany furnishes. The frontiers of the Empire are supported on the Baltic; and thus, having a direct communication with the North, it will be easy for us thence to draw masts, hemp, iron, and such other naval stores as we may want. We at this moment unite all that France, Germany, and Italy produce, as materials for the construction of ships.—The Simplon, become part of France, secures us a new communication with Italy.—The union of Rome has removed that troublesome intermediacy which subsisted between our armies in the north and in the south of Italy, and has given us new coasts on the Mediterranean, as useful and necessary to Toulon, as those of the Adriatic are to Venice. This union also brings with it this double advantage—that the Popes are no longer sovereign Princes, and in the relation of strangers to France. To bring to our recollection all the evils which religion has sustained, by the confounding of temporal with spiritual power, we have only to look into history. The Popes have invariably sacrificed eternal things to temporal ones.—The divorce of Henry VIII. was not the cause of England's separation from the Church of Rome. The pence of St. Peter occasioned that event.—If it be advantageous to the State and to Religion that the Pope should not continue to be a Sovereign Prince, it is equally desirable that the Bishop of Rome, the head of our Church, should not be a stranger to us; but that he should unite in his heart, with the love of religion, that love for this country which characterises elevated minds. Besides, it is the only means whereby that proper influence which the Pope ought to possess over spiritual concerns can be rendered compatible with the principles of the Empire, which cannot suffer any foreign Bishop to exercise an authority therein.

Religion.

The Emperor is satisfied with the spirit which animates all his clergy.—The cares of administration have been directed to the wants of the dioceses.—The establishment of secondary ecclesiastical schools, commonly called *small schools*; the founding of many large seminaries for higher studies; the re-establishment of churches wherever they had been destroyed; and the purchase of several grand cathedrals, of which the revolution had intercepted the construction; are manifest proofs of the interest which the government takes in the splendour of religious worship, and the prosperity of religion.—Religious dissensions, the effect of our political troubles, have entirely disappeared; there are no longer in France any priests but those in communion with their bishops, and as united in their religious principles as in their attachment to Government.—Twenty-seven bishopricks having been for a long time vacant, and the Pope having refused at two different periods, from 1805 to 1807, and from 1808 up to the present moment, to execute the clauses of the Concordat which bind him to institute the Bishops nominated by the Emperor; this refusal has nullified the Concordat—it no longer exists. The Emperor has been, therefore obliged to convoke all the Bishops of the Empire, in order that they may deliberate about the means of supplying the vacant sees, and of nominating to those that may become vacant in future, conformably to what was done under Charlemagne, under St. Louis, and in all the ages which preceded the Concordat of Francis I. and Leo X; for it is of the essence of the Catholic religion not to be able to dispense with the ministry and the mission of Bishops.—Thus has ceased to exist that famous transaction between Francis I. and Leo X. against which the Church, the University, and the Supreme Courts, so long protested, and which made the Publicists and Magistrates of that period say, that the King and the Pope had mutually ceded that which belonged neither to the one nor the other. Henceforward it is to the deliberations of the Council of Paris, that the fate of episcopacy is attached, which will have so much influence upon that of religion itself.—The Council will decide whether France, like Germany, shall be without episcopacy.

(To be continued.)